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Introduction: Content Regulation and the Dilemmas of 
Freedom 
 
One of the recurring dilemmas that arises in considering media regulation generally, 
and those relating to content regulations in particular, is the ambiguous status of 
freedom. Our most common understanding of freedom comes from liberal political 
philosophy, where freedom is equated with the setting of limits to the arbitrary 
exercise of governmental power. John Stuart Mill, in his 1859 essay On Liberty, 
proposed that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
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member of a civilized community, against his [sic] will, is to prevent harm to others’ 
(Mill, 2011 [1859], p. 68). Mill also proposed that ‘the only freedom which deserves 
the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not 
attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it’ (Mill, 2011 
[1859], p. 72), and that for individuals, ‘independence is, of right, absolute … over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’ (Mill, 2011 [1859], 
p. 69).   
 
Nikolas Rose describes this as the ‘negative’ conception of freedom where: 
 
Freedom was imagined as the absence of coercion or domination; it was a 
condition in which the essential subjective will of an individual, a group or a 
people could express itself and was not silenced, subordinated or enslaved by 
an alien power (Rose, 1999: 1).  
 
This is the liberal definition of freedom as the absence of compulsion, coercion, 
intimidation etc., sometimes referred to as negative freedom or, as F. A. von Hayek 
and his followers would have it, positive liberty. But this definition of freedom co-
exists with a second notion of positive freedom, or the need to enable all members of a 
society to have the resources and capabilities required to exercise the forms of moral 
agency associated with civil and political rights. This second notion of freedom 
enabled the extension of rights discourses from the civil and political spheres to the 
social and economic spheres, around the welfare state, the rights of workers to 
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collectively bargain through trade unions, universal provision of health and education 
etc. (Plant, 2010, pp. 115-20). The debate between the Hayekian or ‘minimalist’ 
definition of freedom and the more expansive, ‘social justice’ conception is of course 
an ongoing one. Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities’ approach to development, as outlined in 
Development as Freedom (Sen, 1999), for which he received the Nobel Prize in 
Economics, is one of the more notable recent contributions to this debate.  
 
The third dimension to the question of freedom is its relationship to others, or what 
lawyers would term third party effects, economists term externalities, and sociologists 
study as the problem of social order. This element has been particularly important in 
media and communications law, as it has provided the basis for restricting access to 
particular forms of media content, most notably forms of sexually explicit material 
(pornography) and content displaying levels of violence deemed to be excessive. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, the Communications Act (2003) requires the Office 
of Communication (Ofcom), under s. 319(4) of the Act, to consider whether particular 
content in radio and television programs may cause ‘harm and offence’, and to require 
that the holders of broadcasting licences give due weight to the factors (e.g. audience 
size and composition) relevant to determining the degree of harm and offence that 
such material may cause (Millward and Livingstone, 2009, pp. 276-77). In Australia, 
the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act (1995) requires that 
consideration be given to ‘the standards of morality and decency and propriety 
generally accepted by reasonable adults’ (s. 11(a)). The Australian Broadcasting 
Services Act (1992) has among its Objects (s. 3) the requirements ‘to encourage 
providers of broadcasting services to respect community standards in the provision of 
program material’ (s. 3 (h)), and to ensure that providers of broadcasting services 
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place a high priority on the protection of children from exposure to program material 
which may be harmful to them (s. 3 (i)), as well as ‘to restrict access to certain 
internet content that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult (s. 3 (l)) and to 
protect children from exposure to internet content that is unsuitable for children (s. 
3(m)). In the United States, where there is a general Constitutional protection of 
freedom of expression, there are also laws against obscenity, indecency and profanity 
set out and enforced by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which 
restrict what content can appear on free-to-air broadcasting (Index on Censorship, 
2013).  
 
In this paper I will draw upon the history and institutional practices of media content 
classification in Australia to draw out the degree to which it can be understood as a 
form of governmentality, as espoused by Michel Foucault in his study of the origins 
of political liberalism as a rationality of government. I consider the moral persona of 
the classifier, noting the degree to which they are expected to engage in a form of 
rule-governed pragmatism, which I refer to as casuistry, in their decision-making 
practices. I then consider the devolution of responsibility for media content 
classification from government agencies to industry bodies, analysing the resulting 
regimes of co-regulation and ‘enforced self-regulation’, with particular reference to 
the Australian Law Reform Commission’s review of the National Classification 
Scheme undertaken in 2011-12 and recent work by the Australian Communication 
and Media Authority on adaptive regulation. I conclude that these hybrid forms of 
regulation mark out new modes of governmentality that will increasingly co-exist 
with ‘algorithmic governance’ as practiced by Internet-based companies themselves.  
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Censorship, Classification and Governmentality 
 
The 1960s and early 1970s marked a significant turning point in censorship and 
classification laws throughout the advanced industrial societies. The R v Penguin 
Books Ltd case, which concerned whether Penguin Books was in breach of the U.K. 
Obscene Publications Act (1959) in its decision in 1960 to re-publish D. H. 
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover (first published in 1928) is generally seen to 
constitute a watermark, at least in the English-speaking world. In considering whether 
the novel had the capacity to ‘deprave or corrupt’ – a judgment that Justice Byrne 
would ultimately find in the negative on – the case introduced several critical 
elements into censorship law, which remain in most countries to this day: 
 
• Context: discussion of any individual element of a work needed to place it in the 
context of the work as a whole. The testimony of cultural theorist Richard 
Hoggart was critical to the case in this regard; 
• Merit: the Obscene Publications Act (1959) contained a public good provision 
under s. 4, whereby the public circulation of a work could be justified with 
reference to this being ‘in the interests of science, literature, art or learning, or of 
other objects of general concern’; 
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• The ‘reasonable person’: implicit to the question of whether a work can ‘deprave 
or corrupt’ is a question as to the character of the person involved. This in turn 
leads to distinctions about audience type that can appear arbitrary (e.g. the 
audience at a film festival or an art exhibition as compared to the general public), 
as well as questions about whether the work is likely to be available to a large 
audience or a more limited one. It also points to a distinction between adults and 
children, which remains central to most censorship and classification law.  
 
In Australia, the landmark 1968 Crowe v Graham case saw the concepts of ‘obscene’ 
and ‘offensive’ that existed under indecent publications legislation in the state of New 
South Wales challenged in the High Court of Australia. In its judgment, and in that of 
related cases, a ‘community standards’ test was proposed, as an alternative to the 
common law test of a ‘tendency to deprave or corrupt’ that had been applied based on 
legal precedents dating back to 1868. Subsequent to Crowe v Graham, reforms first 
announced by the Minister for Customs and Excise, the Hon. Don Chipp MP in 1970, 
and enacted by the Whitlam Government in 1972, saw the Australian approach shift 
from a closed and highly interventionist model of censorship into a more open, liberal 
and accountable regime, based around classification as the norm and banning of 
material as the exception, based upon what has come to be known as the ‘community 
standards’ test. Gareth Griffith has observed that ‘whereas censorship is suggestive of 
public order and an idea of the public good, classification is associated with the 
facilitation of informed choice in a community of diverse standards’ (Griffith, 2002: p. 
3).  
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Associated with the shift away from censorship and towards classification in Australia 
was enunciation of the liberal principle that ‘adults should be able to read, hear and 
see what they want’, which has remained a core principle of Australia’s National 
Classification Code to this day. In practice, however, this principle has always been 
qualified by two other principles: (i) that ‘minors should be protected from material 
likely to harm or disturb them’, and (ii) that ‘everyone should be protected from 
exposure to unsolicited material that they find offensive’ (Classification Board, 
2015a). The Classification Act 1995 added the additional principle of ‘the need to 
take account of community concerns about: (i) depictions that condone or incite 
violence, particularly sexual violence; and (ii) the portrayal of persons in a demeaning 
manner’. So freedom as it arose out of the anti-censorship campaigns of the 1960s and 
1970s has co-existed with, and been qualified, by other principles. Moreover, the 
movement is not a linear one. Spurgeon (1999) made the point that there was 
considerably more sex and nudity on Australian television in the 1970s, as seen with 
serial dramas such as Number 96, than was the case in the 1990s, when there was 
controversy about screening of the program Sex/Life in a prime-time viewing period.  
 
Rather than telling the story of this policy field in terms of the turn from censorship to 
freedom – or, inversely, from freedom to ever-greater regimes of censorship – a 
different way of approaching these apparent paradoxes of the relationship of freedom 
and government is through Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality (Foucault 
1991, 2008). In identifying how political liberalism sought to set limits to government 
and ‘reason of state’ (raison d’Etat), it opened up the space for the limits to 
government arising out of governmental practice itself, and the application of ‘critical 
governmental reason’, which turns on ‘the rationality of governmental practice’ and 
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the question of  ‘how not to govern too much’ (Foucault, 2008, pp. 12, 13). This is not 
an absolute divide between the domain of freedom and that of governmental action, 
but rather a shifting space arising out of the politics of government policy itself: 
 
One will not try to determine a division within subjects between one part that 
is subject to governmental action, and another that is definitively, once and for 
all, reserved for freedom … this governmental reason does not divide subjects 
between an absolutely reserved dimension of freedom and another dimension 
of submission that is either consented to or opposed. In fact, the division is … 
in the very domain of governmental practice itself, between the operations that 
can be carried out and those that cannot, between what to do and the means to 
use on the one hand, and what not to do on the other (Foucault, 2008, pp. 11-
12).  
 
Summarising the governmentality perspective on public policy, Dean and Hindess 
observed that: 
 
Government is approached neither as a definite and uniform group of 
institutions nor as the realization of a certain set of political or constitutional 
principles. It is approached, rather, as an inventive, strategic, technical and 
artful set of ‘assemblages’ fashioned from diverse elements, put together in 
novel and specific ways, and rationalized in relation to specific governmental 
objectives and goals (Dean and Hindess, 1998, p. 8).  
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From this perspective, the shift from censorship to classification in Australia can be 
seen, not as a once-and-for-all shift from restrictions to freedom, although it did 
considerably enhance the freedom of adults to access a wider range of media content 
in the first instance. Rather, it can be seen as enabling a more effective 
governmentalisation of the regulatory space for media content, by minimizing the 
amount of actual banning of materials (and with it, the familiar paradox of censorship, 
which is that banning something only serves to make it more attractive), but at the 
same time rendering the scope to apply the tools of media content classification more 
widely. The potential for censorship does not of course disappear under this regime of 
liberal governmentality, as it establishes one end of a spectrum of policy responses, 
that can also include age-based restrictions, time-zone restrictions, and so on. In this 
way, as Nicole Moore has observed, evaluation of regimes of censorship turn less 
upon questions of the freedom or otherwise of the human subject, and instead come to 
be associated with ‘an attempt to identify the limits and effects of regulatory power as 
such’ (Moore, 2013, p. 61), as applied across a much wider array of social, cultural 
and communicative spaces.  
 
Governing Content: Casuistry and its Critics 
 
The other major consequence of the governmentalisation of media content regulation 
is that it seeks, not only to censor except as an exception to the rule, but to establish 
such regulation as a normal component of public administration, taking it out of the 
realm of the law, the police and the courts. As Ian Hunter has observed, with regards 
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to education, this entails establishing the government bureau as an administrative 
centre driven by ‘the deployment of techniques of quantitative calculation and of 
procedural decision-making in a particular domain’ (Hunter, 1994, p. 151).  This in 
turn requires the bureaucratisation of classification decision-making, characterised by 
‘the separation of person and office’ (Gorski, 2005, p. 269), and where the 
classification agency becomes what Max Weber (1978, pp. 957-59) termed a 
particular form of ‘office’, staffed by ‘bureaucrats … “personally” committed to the 
ethos and purposes of their distinctive office even though that ethos lies outside of 
their own personal (i.e. individual) moral predilections or principles’ (du Gay, 2009, p. 
150). This particular personal comportment expected of media classification officers 
requires, among other things ‘the pragmatic rejection of principled politics’ in making 
decisions, and ‘the capacity to detach governmental decisions from personal loyalties 
and … passions’ (Hunter, 1994, pp. 151, 155), and the ‘construction of a buffer 
between civic comportment and personal principles’ (du Gay, 2009, p. 152).  
 
With the ‘de-dramatisation’ and ‘routinisation’ of classification decisions, then, came 
a ‘de-moralisation’ of the field, or an attempt to uncouple such decisions from 
questions of personal morality, belief structures, and politics. It becomes an element 
of the ‘government of the social’ through the application of expertise and the 
codification of knowledge associated with liberal forms of governmentality (Dean, 
2010, pp.  152-54). Decisions are intended to be based upon a close reading of media 
content in order to assess its compliance with particular guidelines and codes. A 
member of the Australian Classifications Board, for instance, is required by law to 
give consideration to such factors as: 
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 (a) the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by 
reasonable adults; and 
(b) the literary, artistic or educational merit (if any) of the publication, film or 
computer game; and 
(c) the general character of the publication, film or computer game, including 
whether it is of a medical, legal or scientific character; and 
(d) the persons or class of persons to or amongst whom it is published or is 
intended or likely to be published (Classification (Publications, Films and 
Computer Games) Act 1995, s. 11).  
 
Three further elements are critical to such a classification regime. First, in order to get 
an additional control over decisions being governed by personal values rather than be 
in line with ‘community standards’, it is a requirement of the Australian Classification 
Board that its membership be ‘broadly representative of the Australian community’ 
(Classification Board, 2015b). Second, the bases on which decisions are made must 
be publicly available, through the Board’s website and by other means. Third, there 
must be avenues for appeal by affected parties, meaning that the Classification 
Board’s decisions can be appealed and be subject to the deliberations of another 
government entity, the Classification Review Board. 
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But an additional factor that comes into play, particularly in the absence of any clear 
yardstick on what ‘community standards’ might be, is that of what is known in legal 
terms as case-based reasoning, or the concept of casuistry (from the Latin casus).  
The concept of casuistry can be found in Catholic moral thought, associated with the 
work of Jesuit theologians in the sixteenth century who grappled with the need to 
assess traditional morality in light of changing reality, as well as the moral challenges 
arising from the private confession of sins and questions of conscience. It places an 
emphasis upon the detailed documentation of how general principles have been 
applied in particular cases, and has been used as a form of pastoral pedagogy, 
providing guidance to those involved in the training of priests based upon analysis of 
practical examples. While its significance declined from the seventeenth century, as 
both Protestant theologians and Enlightenment thinkers associated it with the problem 
of what Blaire Pascal termed ‘laxism’, that ‘served to endow immoral acts with the 
token appearance of morality’ (Stone, 2005, p. 271), it has returned to significance in 
recent years in debates in fields such as bioethics (Jonson and Toulmin, 1988), where 
it can ‘provide a dialectical form of exchange between, on the one hand, what appears 
to be the facts of a particular case and, on the other, one or more generally accepted 
moral principles which appeared to be relevant to this case’ (Mahoney, 2000, p. 98).  
 
The merit of such an approach as an alternative to deductive reasoning based upon 
general moral principles is said to lie in its ability to identify commonalities between 
new cases and those that have appeared previously, enabling the latter to provide 
precedents that can assist in identifying new moral principles based upon a particular 
class of cases. In relation to classification, casuistic reasoning may emerge in a 
context where conflicting moral principles are clearly in play, such as freedom of 
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expression and protection of children. It also reflects the need for guidance on 
particular cases being provided to some degree by past decisions, in the absence of an 
overarching set of ethical principles that can be drawn upon. Community standards as 
a surrogate set of benchmarks are clearly subject to change over time, are not the 
subject of consensus in increasingly diverse societies, and are rarely subject to 
detailed empirical evaluation: the relevance of which could be disputed in any case, if 
one adheres to an ethical principle that overrides the need for community consensus 
on the matter, as with some forms of freedom of speech advocacy, or ethical 
judgements based on particular religious norms and beliefs. 
 
At the same time, the risk is that such casuistic reasoning ends up satisfying no one. 
Seeking to depoliticise issues associated with moral conscience runs the risk of being 
at odds with all sides of a debate. The resulting balancing act undertaken by entities 
such as the Australian Classification Board in practice may satisfy none of the 
stakeholders who engage regularly with these debates. Free speech advocates, Internet 
activists, sexual libertarians, gamers, morals campaigners, children’s rights advocates, 
and feminist critics of “Big Porn” can all find fault with the governmental practices 
through which the classification and regulation of media content occurs. Moreover, as 
the Protestant theologians noted in the 17th century, it may appear to simply be a 
pragmatic accommodation to those interests in power, which is a perennial risk for 
those involved in media classification roles under government jurisdiction. There are 
also the potential charges that those involved in such decisions are not broadly 
representative of the community – a charge to which they are almost certain to be 
found guilty, given the vagueness of the injunction – and that these are inappropriate 
public interventions into matters of private judgement and morality.  
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Self-Regulatory and Co-regulatory Regimes: Diminished State 
Capacity or ‘Soft Law’? 
 
The gradual displacement of censorship by classification in Australia, at the same 
time as the scope of what can and should be classified has expanded, can be captured 
to some degree by the changing names of the government agencies involved. What 
was the Film Censorship Board from 1956 to 1987 became the Office of Film and 
Literature Classification in 1988, which in turn became the Australian Classification 
Board in 1996. At the same time, key elements of the classification process were 
developed to industry bodies. With the passing of the Broadcasting Services Act 
(1992), the classification of radio and television content provided by commercial 
broadcasters became the responsibility of industry classifiers working within the 
networks, as part of devolved responsibility for the development of guidelines, 
decisions about the classification of individual programs, and the handling of 
complaints. This process has been overseen and managed through a co-regulatory 
framework, where relevant industry bodies such as Free TV Australia and the 
Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association (ASTRA) registered 
industry codes of practice with the Australian Communication and Media Authority 
(ACMA) as the relevant government agency.  
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Policy developments such as industry co-regulation and self-regulation are sometimes 
presented as being indicative of a neo-liberal turn in media policy, where ‘decision 
making and regulatory powers have been subcontracted out’ to industry, in the name 
of ‘“slimmed-down” government and less interventionist regulation’ (Freedman, 2008, 
p. 51). But they can also be read as possessing an underlying continuity with earlier 
forms of liberal governmentality, in that what Mitchell Dean terms the ‘concern of the 
art of government’ remains one of searching ‘for a norm that will allow one to define 
the proper scope and limits of government, how much governing the state should do 
and how much should be left up to, or in partnership with, other agencies’ (Dean, 
2010, p. 263). In this way, as Foucault (2008) anticipated, the focus shifts from ‘too 
much’ or ‘too little’ government, to ‘one of getting the balance right between 
governing and not governing, state and civil society, state and market’ (Dean, 2010, p. 
263).  
 
Analyses of the turn to co-regulation in UK media policy (Lunt and Livingstone, 2010) 
and the European Union (Held, 2007) have emphasised the vitally important on-going 
role of the state in such frameworks. While the state is devolving discretionary power 
to non-state regulatory agencies, it is doing so in a context where there is a legal 
connection between these non-state actors and the state regulator, and where the state 
uses regulatory resources to influence outcomes of the regulatory process. In his 
authoritative review of contemporary regulatory practice, Arie Freiberg (2010) 
observes that the benefits of a turn from command-and-control regulation towards 
self-regulation or co-regulation are not simply economic. They are generally seen as 
having advantages in terms of the proximity of the self-regulatory organisations 
themselves to detailed and current industry information, fewer procedural and due 
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process hurdles than those facing government regulators, and the potential promotion 
of greater corporate social responsibility or ‘good corporate citizenship’ on the part of 
regulated firms and industries (Freiberg, 2010, pp. 29-30). Their risks, which are well 
known, include the potential for conflicts of interest to exist, resulting inadequate 
sanctions and under-enforcement of rules, and a relative lack of transparency and 
accountability (Freiberg, 2010, pp. 30-31). They are part of a wider regimen of ‘soft 
law’ arrangements, identified by Freiberg (2010, p. 186) as being ‘at the borderline 
between the public and the private, between law and non-law, and between self-
regulation, co-regulation and government regulation’. ‘Soft law’ has its roots in 
international law and governance, where there is typically not a single international 
agency capable of enforcing norms and rules between nation-states. Freiberg makes 
the point that ‘where it is produced by non-state actors and where it is only enforced 
by non-state actors, it is truly “soft”’ (Freiberg, 2010, p. 186): in order to have 
regulatory ‘teeth’, it typically requires the capacity of the state to act at some level in 
the enforcement of rules and norms.  
 
Lunt and Livingstone observed that, for the new convergent media regulators, such as 
the Office of Communication (Ofcom) in the UK and the ACMA in Australia, a 
vitally important component of their role is that of informing, engaging and 
empowering the broader civil society, whether as citizens in a democracy, as 
consumers in a fast-changing media marketplace, or as representatives of interest 
groups engaged with the regulatory process. This is because innovation in governance 
is no longer simply a matter of the balance between government agencies and 
regulated industries: it also needs to manage and if necessary redirect information 
flows in such as ways as to ‘create more access to governance networks for the weak, 
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and for weaker players to learn to use more effectively the methods perfected by the 
powerful’ (Burris et. al., 2008, p. 33). This is a necessary countervailing force to 
greater industry self-regulation and co-regulation, and one which has the potential to 
strengthen – rather than weaken – regulatory capacities, as it promotes civil society 
groups and organisations as being the monitors of potential regulatory capture 
between regulated industries and those agencies responsible for their regulation 
(Christensen, 2011; Flew, 2014; on ‘monitory democracy’ more broadly, see Keane, 
2009).  
 
Assessing Media Content Governance Regimes: The Australian 
Case 
 
In Australia, as in many other countries, there are three broad regimes of media 
content classification and regulation: 
 
1. The government regulatory framework applied to media content classification 
through the National Classification Code, with its origins in censorship policies. 
This framework applies to films, some publications, and to video and computer 
games. It is administered by the Classification Board and through the Attorney-
General’s Department, and it has significant legal sanctions for breaches of the 
Code, as well as a strong emphasis on accountability and transparency; 
2. The co-regulatory regime for broadcasting applied by the industry itself, 
overseen and enforced by the Australian Communication and Media Authority 
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(ACMA). This framework applies to radio, television, and – at least notionally – 
to Internet content. The code is applied by the broadcasters themselves, and 
administered by industry representative bodies subject to the jurisdiction of the 
ACMA, as part of the Department of Communication; 
3. The self-regulatory approaches applied by digital content providers and service 
platforms, including Google/YouTube, Apple iTunes, Facebook, and many 
others. These entities all manage various forms of content regulation and 
management, although relatively little is known about how such guidelines work 
in practice, and levels of accountability and transparency are typically low. The 
providers would argue that the sheer volume of content they deal with, the speed 
at which decisions have to be made, and the global reach of these platforms, 
would make it difficult to apply classification in a different way. 
 
In March 2011, the then Attorney-General of Australia, Robert McClelland MP, 
asked the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) to inquire into and report on 
the framework for classification of media content in Australia, and to recommend 
reforms to the National Classification Scheme. The ALRC was required to consider 
the extent to which the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 
1995 and related laws continued to provide an effective framework for the 
classification of media content in Australia, and what changes were required to this 
regulatory framework. Among the factors the ALRC was required to consider were 
technological and media convergence, community expectations about content 
regulation, the scope to reduce regulatory burdens and apply existing laws more 
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effectively, and the future development of the Australian media and digital content 
industries (Flew, 2012).  
 
In the course of receiving over 2,500 public submissions in 12 months, and 
conducting over 60 consultations with industry, community and other stakeholders, 
the ALRC found that while there was general support for some form of media content 
classification, the clear message was that there was a need for fundamental reform to 
the National Classification Scheme, rather than incremental changes to existing 
legislation. This was a particularly strongly held view of industry participants, with 
the Australian Publishers Association describing the current scheme as ‘an analogue 
piece of legislation in a digital world’, and the Special Broadcasting Service calling 
for ‘a framework that applies across platforms in a consistent and equitable manner’ 
(quoted in ALRC, 2012, pp. 59, 60). Focusing on the wider regulatory implications of 
media convergence and digitisation of content, the digital media giant Google 
observed: 
 
The media environment has changed dramatically in the twenty years since the 
ALRC last considered censorship and classification. The existing 
classification regime was developed in an age where the media landscape was 
characterised by technologically distinct vertical media silos: radio, television, 
Internet etc. These media publishers created the content to be consumed by a 
passive audience. Today’s media landscape is very different. The ‘audience’ 
of passive recipients of content has been replaced by citizen creators and 
citizen journalists engaging interactively with media platforms/services … to 
create and distribute content. Vertical media silos have been replaced by a 
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horizontal, converged landscape of platforms, content providers and users, 
facilitated by communications networks ... In this changed environment, how 
we determine the appropriate policy approach to regulation of content needs to 
be fundamentally reconsidered (quoted in ALRC, 2012, p. 60).  
 
The ALRC proposed a principles-based approach for reform as the basis for a new 
National Classification Scheme that could respond to changing community needs and 
expectations, be more effective and consistent in its application, and be adaptive in 
the face of technological change and media convergence. This would mean, for 
instance, that the principle that ‘Australians should be able to read, hear, see and 
participate in media of their choice’, who co-exist with a principle that 
‘communications and media services available to Australians should broadly reflect 
community standards, while recognising a diversity of views, cultures and ideas in the 
community’ (ALRC, 2012, pp. 80-83). It proposed that ‘classification regulation 
should be kept to the minimum needed to achieve a clear public purpose’, and that 
‘classification regulation should be focused upon content rather than platform or 
means of delivery’ (ALRC, 2012, pp. 57-58). The final point meant that there would 
be one legislative regime establishing obligations to classify or restrict access to 
content across media platforms, with a single Commonwealth regulatory agency 
having responsibility, and that its focus would be on so-called ‘higher-level’ content 
(in terms of sexual explicitness, violence etc.), with much of the more general media 
content classification being undertaken by industry itself, with the development of 
classification codes subject to oversight by a convergent media regulator (ALRC, 
2012, pp. 24-29).  
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The ALRC Review of the National Classification Scheme took place alongside the 
Convergence Review of communications legislation, and both reviews shared the 
observation that: 
 
Australia’s policy and regulatory framework for content services is still 
focused on the traditional structures of the 1990s – broadcasting and 
telecommunications. The distinction between these categories is increasingly 
blurred and these regulatory frameworks have outlived their original purpose 
(Convergence Review 2012: vii).  
 
In the media content classification field, an example of the subsequent ‘broken 
concepts’ that the ACMA (2011) ahs referred to is in the area of computer games. If 
games are purchased as physical objects in a store, they are taken to be akin to a 
publication, and hence subject to the Classifications Act. If such games content is 
online, however, it is Internet content, and therefore subject to the provisions of the 
Broadcasting Services Act. If it takes the form of an app, downloadable from Apple 
iTunes, Google Play or other equivalent sites, its status in terms of Australian 
government classification is unclear, although it is widely acknowledged that such 
sites are extensively curated by the companies themselves, with Apple seen as being 
particularly diligent in terms of ensuring a ‘family-friendly’ app store. Moreover, 
consumers can set their devices to screen content based on the classification rules of 
Australia or many other territorial jurisdictions. The ACMA has identified mobile 
apps as an ongoing regulatory challenge as ‘the development of the one device, one 
platform environment was bringing together a number of previously distinct sectors—
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telecommunications, radiocommunications, broadcasting, computing, publishing and 
financial services’, and such developments ‘pose challenges to traditional approaches 
to regulation where apps are not reflected in existing legislative or regulatory 
concepts’ (ACMA, 2015, p. 6). The ALRC recommended that responsibility for 
games classification should shift the Classification Board to industry self-
classification under an agreement with a relevant government regulator (ALRC, 2012, 
pp. 159-63), and Australian government policy has subsequently moved in this 
direction.  
 
The ACMA’s approach to media content governance is important to note, as it 
envisages its own role diminishing over time. Perhaps more accurately, it aims to 
devolve regulatory responsibilities through its provision of an evidence base that can 
‘build capability among our stakeholders to make communication and media work in 
Australia’s public interest’ (ACMA, 2015, p. 1). Drawing upon the insights of 
regulatory theorists such as Malcolm Sparrow (Sparrow, 2008, 2008), such an 
approach is less about controlling a space in order to make it capable of being subject 
to regulatory techniques by public agencies, as it is about ‘how a regulator might 
influence, and potentially intervene, in the behaviour of industry players and citizens’, 
moving from achieving the full administration of media towards focusing upon the 
‘mitigation of harms’, both real and potential (ACMA, 2015, p. 12). Such regulatory 
practice draws upon the techniques of ‘soft law’ and the methodologies of 
behavioural economics and ‘nudge theory’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009; John, 2011), 
to engage in adaptive regulatory practice which the ACMA (2015, p. 23) describes as 
involving three elements: 
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• adopting problem-solving approaches;  
• breaking down problems into parts with associated measureable tasks; 
• using collaborative partnerships in the design and delivery of adaptive solutions.  
 
The adaptive regulatory practice proposed by the ACMA in this instance marks a turn 
from govenrmentality driven by the rule-governed pragmatism of the Weberian 
bureaucrat towards hybrid forms of government regulation, industry self-regulation, 
consumer advice and citizen engagement, that Freiberg refers to by the awkward 
neologism of enforced self-regulation (Freiberg, 2010, p. 31). In the governmentality 
literature, Dean notes that these ‘advanced liberal’ forms of government are based less 
upon the promise of a ‘government of society’ – which was subject to the neoliberal 
critique of risking ‘governing too much’ and suppressing social innovation – towards 
the promotion of a kind of ‘responsible freedom’, where such freedom can ‘act as a 
principle of a philosophical critique of government while at the same time being an 
artefact of multiple practices of government’ (Dean, 2010, pp. 192, 193). Suggesting 
that dominant critiques of neoliberalism are too economically reductionist to fully 
capture the dynamics of such changing forms of governmental practice (c.f. Barnett, 
2010; Flew, 2014), Dean instead suggests that these contemporary concerns with 
adaptive regulation point towards ‘a concern of the art of government … to search for 
a norm that will allow one to define the proper scope and limits of government, how 
much governing the state should do and how much should be left up to, or in 
partnership with, other agencies’ (Dean, 2010, p. 263).  
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Conclusion 
 
I have argued in this paper that, rather than seeing the history of media content 
classification as a never ending struggle between the desire for freedom and the forces 
of censorship, we can understand it as a case study in evolving modes of 
governmentality in liberal societies, where ideas of freedom have long co-existed with 
practices of governance. Using Australian media content classification as a case study, 
I have proposed that such a framework enables us to better understand the shifting 
parameters of media content regulation, from direct monitoring by government 
agencies such as the Classification Board, to co-regulation with government oversight, 
and the regulator taking a more active role in informing consumer-citizens and 
industry itself on the requirements of regulation. It is a case study in the turn towards 
‘soft law’ and regulation based upon the mitigation of harms, informed by 
behavioural economics and ‘nudge theory’. Further exploration of this topic would 
consider how these regulatory regimes – command-and-control, co-regulation, and 
self-regulation – increasingly co-exit with what has been termed ‘algorithmic 
regulation’, or governance based upon the management of big data flows according to 
specified rules and calculations, that is being undertaken within the big Internet-based 
companies themselves (Muciani, 2013).  
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